Single Question. Whether the Bad Angel necessarily Wills badly

1. About the seventh distinction I ask whether the bad angel necessarily wills badly.a

a. a[Interpolation] About the seventh distinction, where the Master [Lombard] deals with the confirmation of the good and the obstinacy of the bad, there is one question, namely whether^

2. That he does not:

James 2.19: “The demons believe and they tremble;” but these are, as it seems, good acts;     therefore etc     .

3. Further, the image [of God] remains in them, according to Psalm 38.7, “Man in image passes through     etc .;” so in this respect they have capacity for God and are sharers in him (for in this respect is the image of God in the soul, “whereby it can have capacity for God and be sharer in him,” according to Augustine On the Trinity 14.8 n.11); but they cannot grasp God or be sharers in him save by a good act; therefore      there can be good acts in them.

4. Further, Dionysius Divine Names 4, “in the demons their natural abilities remain complete,” therefore their free choice is complete; but “the ‘possibility for sin’ is not freedom nor part of freedom,” according to Anselm On Free Choice 1;a therefore they have freedom of choice for that for which it per se exists, which is ‘willing well’; therefore they can will well.

a. a[Interpolation] ‘Free choice is the power of keeping rectitude for its own sake’, Anselm On Free Choice 3.

5. Further, no intellect is so turned away from the first principle that it cannot know anything true, because the first principles are true for any intellect from the terms; therefore no will is so turned away from the ultimate end that it cannot will the ultimate end. The consequence is plain from the similitude of the Philosopher, Physics 2.9.200a15-16, Ethics 7.9.1151a16-17, “As the principle is in matters of speculation, so is the end in moral matters.” - There is also proof of the consequence in another way, that “everyone bad is ignorant” (Ethics 3.2.1110b28-30); therefore there is no malice in the will without error in the intellect. Therefore where the intellect cannot be blinded about some intelligible object, there neither can the will be wrong about the same object as desirable or lovable.

6. Further, if they necessarily will badly, and they are always in an act of willing (because they do not have any impediment) - then they are always willing badly and so they are increasing their malice to infinity; but if, by the law of divine justice, to an increase in guilt there corresponds an increase in punishment, then their punishment would grow infinitely;     therefore they will never be in their term. Something else unacceptable also follows, that by parity of reasoning charity could be increased in the good if malice can be increased in the bad, and thus it follows that the good would never be in the term of blessedness just as neither the bad in the term of malice; therefore etc     .

7. Further, “nothing violent is perpetual” (De Caelo 1.2.269b6-10), because it is contrary to the inclination of that in which it is - and so, if that thing is left to itself, it returns to the opposite state (just as water, if left to itself, returns to coldness); but malice is against nature, according to Damascene; therefore it is not perpetual. Therefore it is not in the will necessarily.

8. To the opposite:

In Psalm 73.23, “The pride of those who hate you rises up always,” but this cannot be understood as to intensity, because thus no evil would be so intense that there would not be a greater evil; therefore it has to be understood extensively, and so they are always sinning.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinions of Others

9. Here there is posited a double cause for the continuation of malice in them.

First thus: the appetite is proportioned to its apprehensive power, by which it is moved as a movable thing is moved by a mover; but an angel apprehends immovably, non-discursively, because he does so through intellect - man apprehends movably, through reason discursively, wherein he has a discursive way of going to either opposite. The will of an angel, therefore, immovably adheres after the first complete apprehension, while the will of man - in line with a volition following reason - adheres movably. And therefore, although the will of an angel, before it had fixed itself by a complete volition, would have been movable to opposites (otherwise it could not have sinned or merited indifferently), yet after the first choice it immovably adhered to what it had chosen; and thus the good angel was made radically impeccable and the bad radically impenitent -from the immobility of the cognitive power.

10. Another way is posited as follows, that the more perfect the will the more perfectly it immerses itself in the willable thing. When separated from body, of which sort the angelic will is, it is altogether perfectly free - but our will, conjoined to a corruptible body, has a diminished liberty; and therefore, although our will has liberty, yet the angelic will, which is altogether separate from body, has it maximally. Our will too, “when existing in an incorruptible body,” immovably immerses itself in the object so that it cannot rebound from it.

11. Now the manner is assigned from Proverbs 18.5, “The sinner, when he comes into the depths, despises.” When therefore the will is perfectly free in a preceding perfect choice, it efficaciously runs to the thing willed, placing there its end; but when it comes to the obstacle of conscience, it does not stop at it but thrusts itself into it and is blunted back so that it neither wills nor can will to withdraw itself; just as iron, if driven into bone, is blunted back and cannot be withdrawn, either by the same force by which it was driven in or by a stronger one.

B. Rejection of the Opinions together

12. Against the conclusion, in which these two opinions come together, there seems to be the authority of Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter n.34 where he speaks thus, “If it were possible that human nature, after it turned from God and lost the goodness of the will, could have had it again from itself, much more would the angelic nature have this, which, the less it is burdened by the weight of an earthly body, the more it would be endued with this ability     etc .” - The argument then goes as follows: if the human will could of itself return to justice, much more the angelic will; therefore      the angelic will, neither because of the immovability of its cognitive power (of the sort that the cognitive power of our will is not), nor because of its own full liberty (from the fact it is separate from body), is incapable of returning to justice after it has sinned; on the contrary, according to Augustine [Fulgentius], it is more capable than our will is.

13. Further, I argue against this common opinion.

First as follows: not only is the will of a damned angel obstinate, but also the will of a damned human being (and one should assign a common cause for both, according to what Augustine [Fulgentius] seems to say op.cit. a little after the cited passage, where he maintains that there is one common cause why God will together judge human spirits and damned angels - and he seems to maintain the same in City of God 21.11, 23); but neither of these causes [nn.9-11] can be posited as the cause of the obstinacy of a damned human being; therefore not of an angel either.

14. Proof of the assumption [sc. the minor premise, n.13]: because the conjoined soul does not have a cognitive power that immovably apprehends, as an angel does, according to the first way [n.9] - nor even does it have such liberty that it immerses itself in the object immovably, according to the second way [n.10].a Therefore one has to assign a cause for this obstinacy in the soul when it is separate; so either the soul is then obstinate before any elicited act (and consequently neither of the aforesaid causes is the cause of its obstinacy because, before it wills anything according to an act of an immovably apprehending intellect or from the full liberty it has when separate, it was already obstinate) - or it was obstinate through some act that it elicited when separate (which, according to the first way, follows the immovable apprehension of a separate intellect, or, according to the second, full liberty); but this second option seems unacceptable, because a soul does not demerit when separated, but only through the acts that it had on the way does it receive what it merited or demerited; so it has no act preceding the obstinacy by which to be rendered obstinate.b

a. a[Interpolation] according to perfect liberty, according to the second way;     therefore it cannot rebound back - which is false.

b. b[Interpolation] Or thus: the sinning soul is obstinate in the instant of separation, because it is in the term - yet not by an act that it then elicits, because in the same instant in which it is separated the whole composite is corrupted, and in that instant it does not understand; nor even is it obstinate through an act preceding that instant, because then it was a wayfarer; therefore etc     . Or thus: if the will of a man, because it has an immovable apprehension, renders itself obstinate, whether this is while it is in the body or while it is outside the body; not while in the body because then it does not have an immovable apprehension (since it is a wayfarer) - nor in the second way because in the instant of separation the soul is obstinate and damned (but it does not then have apprehension, because that is the instant of corruption);     therefore etc     .

15. A confirmation can be taken from Lazarus, whose intellect, when he was dead, had the apprehension of a separated soul and whose will had full liberty (because it was separated); and yet because of neither of these did he will immovably, because then he would have been impeccable if he was good (and then God would have done a prejudice to him when he resurrected him, because then he would have made him peccable from being impeccable), or obstinate if bad - but both of these are false (because he was still a wayfarer!), unless one imagines that God miraculously suspended him from an operation of the sort that follows a separated soul (in as much as he predestined to resurrect him), but this does not seem probable, because he is said to have narrated many things that he had seen.Vatican editors: Scotus seems to be referring to stories that appeared in the 11th or 12th centuries, found in an ancient manuscript from Perugia. They were printed in Italian by a certain Razzi in 1613 and reprinted in Orvieto in 1859 under the title of Life and Praises of St. Mary Magdalene, St. Martha, and St. Lazarus bishop and martyr. ⁹

16. Further, second: a total cause does not cause differently unless it is itself, according as it is cause, differently disposed, and this when no diversity is posited on the part of the undergoing subject or on the part of any extrinsic impediments; but the will as naturally prior to its act, not as actually existing in act, is cause of its act (which is manifest from the fact it is a free cause of its act, which freedom does not belong to it save as it is prior to its act - because as it is in act it has the act as natural form; it is also plain that a thing, as it is under an effect as under a form, is posterior, as the composite is posterior to its form, Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-7); therefore the will is not differently disposed in eliciting an act unless it is differently disposed as it is prior to act. But from the fact that it is posited as having an act inherent in it [nn.9-11], it would not be differently disposed as it is naturally prior to act, because although it would be as it is in act differently disposed, namely as to a certain accident, yet not as to its nature, according to which it is the sort of first act that the will is; therefore, as the will is understood to be in any act whatever, it will not be differently disposed in eliciting any act whatever; therefore through no act (or habit) that is posited in it as it is separated, and that cannot be posited in it as conjoined, will it be eliciting in a way opposite (a good act or a bad act) to the way it was eliciting before, and so, if before it acted contingently, by nothing of the sort - posited in it - will it elicit necessarily.a

a. a[Interpolation] Or thus: the will is not cause of its volition save as naturally prior to it, so if it is not differently disposed as it is naturally prior to it, it is not differently disposed as it is cause of it; but as it is naturally prior it is not differently disposed by the fact that it is under an act of willing, because it is thus disposed in first act; therefore it is not by that act differently disposed in causing - therefore it does not through the act that it is placed under become ‘impeccable’ or ‘impenitent’ [n.9]. Confirmation: a cause that in itself is uniformly disposed to several effects, by the fact that it causes one, it is not differently disposed as regard another, as is plain of heat with respect to several heatings; but the will is cause with respect to several volitions; therefore by the fact that it elicits one it is not differently disposed as to eliciting another. Therefore if it elicited the first freely, such that with respect thereto it was not impeccable, neither will it be impeccable with respect to another. - Second confirmation: the will of an angel, with respect to the act that is posited as the cause of its obstinacy [nn.9=11], is disposed contingently (and only necessarily disposed by necessity in a certain respect), because it is cause of the act as it is naturally prior to it - and as such it elicits contingently; but such an act does not more necessitate the will with respect to another act than with respect to itself;     therefore etc     . Third...

17. The reasoning is confirmed, because no second cause can be the cause for a principal cause of acting in a way opposite to the way belonging to the principal cause from its own causality; for thus the principal cause would not be principal cause, because it would be determined by the second cause to a mode of acting opposite to its own proper mode of acting; therefore since the will is principal cause of its act (because whatever is posited in the will with respect to its act will either not be the cause of thus eliciting the act, or, if it is the cause, it is a second cause in respect of the will, and not principal cause), it follows that the will is by nothing else determined to acting.

18. Further, as was said d.4-5 nn.45-46 and d.6 n.77, both the good angel and the bad had time such that they were not wayfarers for an instant only; but the bad angel had several sins in order - namely from the act of loving himself he elicited an act of loving the supreme advantage, and from that an act of excellence (whereby he willed to have that advantage not under the rule of the superior will but against it), and finally an act of hating God (who resisted him in that appetite [d.6 nn.37-40, 51-54, 63, 78]), and he did not have all those acts distinctly at the same time; therefore, when he was demeriting in the second sin, he was still on the way, and yet he had already sinned with the first sin from the first choice. Therefore not any sort of immovable apprehension or any sort of first sin, or full immersion in the object, made him impenitent; for whenever he sinned in one of those sins on the way, it was not the same as the preceding sin.

C. Rejection of the First Opinion in Particular

19. Further, against the first way [n.9] there is argument specifically.

First, because it supposes something false, namely that the intellect is a sufficient mover - as will be made clear in 2 d.25 [lacking in Ordinatio, but found in Lectura 2 d.25 n.69].

Second, this false thing is repugnant in two ways to the statements of those who hold this position. First, because since the intellect of the angels was right in apprehending (for punishment does not precede guilt), it was moving the will to desire something rightly; nor could it move the will otherwise, because the intellect moves by way of nature and consequently it can only move according to the mode of cognition that it has; therefore it moves the will to willing rightly. Therefore the will could in no way sin. - Second, the false thing contradicts their position because, if from the idea of mover and movable there is a proportion of the sort between them, the will not only will be immovable after the first choice of the will, but will be in itself first so even before the first choice - because the angels’ intellect, just as it immovably shows something after the first choice of the will, so does it also do so before it; and if the intellect itself, when immovably apprehending, moves the appetite immovably, then it will move immovably in the first act, and consequently not after the first act only!

21. Further, from this way it seems to follow that since, according to them, the angel was created in grace [d.4-5 n.24] and thus had some act in grace (because it is not likely that in the first instant he was idle, for he was not impeded - and if he was then idle he would perhaps have sinned by the sin of omission), and he did not sin with grace (as is plain) - then at some point he had according to grace a good and full choice, because a choice following perfect apprehension of the intellect, for, according to them, there is only such apprehension in the angels, and this apprehension immovable and not discursive [n.9]. Therefore any angel in that first good choice confirmed himself and was made impeccable.

22. Further, the difference between the wills of man and angel [n.9] is not valid, because although the angel understands non-discursively what - according to them - man understands discursively, yet the intellect of man does not movably adhere to that which he reaches discursively; for he holds the conclusion he reaches discursively with as much certitude (that is, without doubting) as an angel holds it by seeing it non-discursively in the principle; therefore this immovability of the human intellect (that is, this certitude) would have an equally immovable will just as does the other immovability posited in the angel. Also, the fact that all discursive reasoning is denied to the angels does not seem probable - as is proved above [Ord. Prol. nn.208-209, 2 d.1 nn.312-314].

D. Rejection of the Second Opinion in Particular

23. Against the second way [nn.10-11] there is argument specifically:

Because, just as a natural agent does not dominate its act, so neither does it dominate its mode of acting - and, by the opposite, as a free agent dominates its action so too does it dominate its mode of acting, and consequently it is in its power to act intensely or weakly; therefore there is no need, from the fact the will is perfectly free, that it should immerse itself with supreme effort in the object; rather it dominates itself more, since it tends to the object with any amount of effort at all and is thus carried freely to any object at all, and it can also by its absolute liberty not be thus carried to the object. There is a confirmation for this as well, that not all the bad angels seem to have sinned with their utmost effort, just as neither do all the good angels seem to have merited with their utmost effort - or at least it was possible for them not to elicit an act with the whole faculty of their nature.

24. Further, a thing tends (or moves) to the term by the same principle by which it rests in it; therefore if the will - perfectly free - tends of its perfect liberty to an object, then by the same liberty it rests in it; therefore from the full liberty of tending to an object, the sort of liberty that the bad angels sinned with, the resting of the will in it does not necessarily follow, but only a voluntary and contingent resting, just as the will contingently tends to it.

25. Further, as was touched on in the first common way against both ways [n.14], it cannot be said that the will of a separated soul renders itself obstinate by any act that it is then eliciting, because it is obstinate naturally prior to its eliciting some act as it is separated, for it is in the term; therefore it renders itself obstinate by some act that it elicits in the body, by thrusting itself then into the conscience; but this is false, both because it was then a wayfarer - and because someone can, by the sin because of which he is damned if penance does not follow, sin with lesser effort than the effort someone else (or himself) sins with by the same sin, and that sin is destroyed through penance.

26. Further, against the example about the sharp iron, by thrusting it into bone [n.11]. Although this example and the whole position seem similar to the saying of Hesiod, Metaphysics 3.4.1000a9-19, that “those were made immortals who tasted nectar and manna [ambrosia]” (which saying the Philosopher there mocks, because people like the Hesiodans “have despised our understanding”, for - according to the Philosopher there - what is meant by such hyperbolic or metaphorical words cannot be understood, nor is it the manner of a philosopher or a scientist to speak in such way) - yet, by taking the example for what it is worth as to the intended conclusion, the opposite deduction can be made. For why is sharp iron, when fixed in a hard body, not able to be extracted by the cause or power that fixed it in? - the reason is that the parts of the body in which it was thrust cling more together, and so the thing fixed in it is more compressed than at the beginning when it was being fixed in; but if the motive power is increased, then by the amount of increase that the motive power adds - if the thing fixed in remains equally straight in its nature - it can now by extracted. Therefore since the will, when thrusting into anything, remains straight in its natural powers (even though it may have some curvature, that is, a certain deformity, a sort of inherent privation), and since that in which it immerses itself does not have, when it immerses itself, a greater power of enclosing it (because there is in the object no such clinging together), the result is that the active will can withdraw itself.

II. Scotus’ own Response

27. For the solution of this question [n.1] two things need to be seen; namely first the degrees of goodness and malice - second what goodness there could be in the volition of a damned angel, or whether any malice is necessarily present in it.

A. On the Degrees of Goodness and Malice

28. About the first I say that over and above the natural goodness of volition that belongs to it insofar as it is a positive being and that also belongs to any positive being according to the degree of its entity (the more the more, the less the less) - besides this goodness there is a triple moral goodness, disposed according to degree: the first of which is called goodness in genus, the second can be called virtuous goodness or goodness from circumstance, and third is meritorious goodness or gratuitous goodness or goodness from divine acceptation in its order to reward.

29. Now the first belongs to volition from its being about an object befitting such an act according to the dictate of right reason, and not merely because it befits the act naturally (as the sun befits vision). And this is the first moral goodness, which is therefore called ‘in genus’ because it is as it were material with respect to any further goodness in the genus of morals; for the act about an object is able as it were to be formed through any other moral circumstance, and so it is as it were potential; but it is not altogether outside the genus of morals (as the act itself in its genus of nature was), but is in the genus of morals, because it already has something from that genus, namely an object befitting the act.

30. The second goodness belongs to volition from the fact that it is elicited by the will along with all circumstances that have been dictated by right reason as having to belong to the will in eliciting the volition; for the good is from ‘an integral cause’ (according to Dionysius Divine Names 4) - and this is as it were the good in the species of morals, because it now has all the moral differences that contract the good in genus.

31. The third goodness belongs to the act from the fact that, on the presupposition of double goodness already stated, the act is elicited in conformity with the principle of merit (which is charity or grace) or according to the inclination of charity.

32. An example of the first goodness: to give alms. An example of the second: to give alms from one’s own property to a pauper who needs it, and in the place in which it can better befit the pauper and for the love of God. An example of the third: to do this work not only from natural inclination, such as could have happened in the state of innocence (or perhaps it could still now be done by a sinner if, while still being a sinner and not penitent, he were moved by natural piety for his neighbor), but also from charity, which he who acts from is a friend of God, insofar as God has regard to his work.

33. Now this triple goodness is so ordered that the first is presupposed by the second and not conversely, and the second by the third and not conversely.

34. To this triple goodness is opposed a triple malice; the first indeed is malice in genus, namely when an act that has only natural goodness (from which it should be constituted in the genus of morals) has malice because it is about an unfitting object (for example if ‘to hate’ is about God); the second is malice from some circumstance that makes the act disordered, even though the act is about an object fitting the act -according to right reason; the third is malice in demerit.

35. Now any of these malices can be taken as contrary to, or privative of, its goodness; and as taken privatively it only removes the goodness - but as taken contrarily it posits something beyond that lack which is repugnant to such goodness. And this distinction is plain in Boethius On Aristotle’s Categories 3 ch. on quality.

36. But malice in genus, taken contrarily and privatively, is convertible - and so, just as between immediate privation and immediate habit there is no middle, so good in genus and bad in genus are immediate contraries; the reason is that an act cannot not be about an object, and the object is fitting or not fitting to the act; and so necessarily an act is good in genus from a fitting object, and an act is bad in genus from an unfitting object.

37. Malice taken privatively and contrarily in the second way is not convertible. For an act can lack a circumstance required for the perfection of a virtuous act and yet not be elicited with a repugnant circumstance that would render the act vicious; for example, if one gives alms to a pauper not from the circumstance of the end (because one does not consider it), nor according to other circumstances required for a virtuous act, then this act is not morally good or vicious - nor however is it bad contrarily, because it is not ordered to an undue end, as one would do if one gave alms to a pauper for vainglory or some other undue end.

38. Malice in the third way taken contrarily and privatively is not convertible -because an act can be bad privatively (such that it is not elicited from grace), and yet it would not be de-meritorious; the thing is plain from the second way [n.37], because an act which is good simply in the genus of morals is not meritorious and yet not every such act is de-meritorious; and thus both in the second way and here there seems to exist an ‘indifferent act’ - an act that, although it is bad privatively, is yet not so contrarily (because it is indifferent), and this indifference will be spoken of elsewhere [d.41 nn.6-14 below]. Likewise, an act can be neutral in the third way (that is, neither good nor bad, taking these contrarily), not only because of the neutrality of the act in the second way, but because of the disposition of the operator; for example, if in a state of innocence -without grace - someone had rightly acted, that act would have been perfectly good in the second way and not good in the third way, because it did not have the principle for meriting nor was it bad contrarily.

39. Perhaps however in this present state of life there is no act neutral between good and bad taken in the third way, save in one case, namely when the act is good from its circumstance and yet to it charity does not incline. And the reason is that anyone now is either in grace or in sin. If in grace and he has an act good in the second way, then grace inclines to it and thus it is meritorious; if he has an act bad in the second way, it is plain that he is de-meritorious (for always the first malice brings in the second, not conversely; and the second the third, not conversely). But if he is bad [sc. in sin] and he has an act good in the second way, then he is not good in the third way and not bad in the third way; therefore he is neutral as to good and bad as these are contraries in the third way, but he is not neutral speaking of the second way.

B. On Goodness and Malice in the Bad Angel

40. About the second point [n.27] I say that a bad angel’s having a good volition can be understood of this triple goodness.

1. On Goodness in Genus

41. And as to the first goodness, which is in genus, there is no doubt but that he could and does have many volitions about an object befitting such act (as in loving himself, hating punishment, and thus in many others).

2. On Meritorious Goodness

42. But as to the other two modes of goodness, namely virtuous and meritorious, there is difficulty.

And first one must see about meritorious goodness.

Here I say that a bad angel cannot have a volition good in this way, understanding this in the composite sense, because that he is bad and that he has a volition good in this way do not stand together, just as neither can a white thing be black in the composite sense, because then the same thing would at the same time be white and black. But in the divided sense it can be denied of a bad angel either by logical potency or by real potency; if real, either the one which states the idea of principle or the one which is a difference of being and which states order to act [cf. Ord. 1 d.20 nn.11-12].

a) On Real Potency which is a Principle

43. About real potency then, one must see how a bad angel does not have ‘the potency which is a principle’ for willing thus.

This principle, first, is understood to be a passive one - and the bad angel has this, because his will is a thing receptive of some right volition; for what is of itself receptive of some right volition is, as long as it remains in itself, not non-receptive; but his will was at some time receptive of a good volition (because before damnation he was able to have merited and been blessed), and he has not lost his natural powers now; therefore now his will is a thing thus receptive.

As to, second, the active principle of right volition, we can speak either about the total principle of volition or about a partial principle. The will indeed is a partial active principle, as has been touched on [I d.17 nn.32, 151-153; Lectura 2 d.25 n.69]; and the bad angel has it complete (according to Dionysius, [n.4]) and the same as he had it in the state of innocence; and consequently it is not true to deny the potency of him, that is, the partial active principle of meritorious volition. But this is not the total principle, because the will alone does not suffice for meritorious willing, but grace is required as a cooperating principle; nor is his will a ‘partial principle’ that is principal or sufficient for putting another partial principle in being; for although a will using the grace already possessed is principal agent as regard the act, however, when grace is not possessed, the will is not sufficient for putting grace into existence, because grace cannot be put into existence save by God alone creating it.

45. And thus a bad angel does not have the total active principle for acting, nor is he a partial active principle in whose power it is to produce in being the remaining partial active principle and to remove the impediments to the use of himself and of his principle for eliciting the act and effect that is common to them. An example of this would be if someone possessed of sight were in darkness; although he would then have a partial principle for an act of seeing (and a principal principle for seeing when light and the visual power come together), yet he does not then have the total principle nor the principal principle sufficient for putting into existence what is required for the effect of these two partial principles, nor even would he be able to remove impediments; and therefore although he has the visual power (inasmuch as he has a principle diminished with respect to vision), yet it would not be in his power to see. Thus I say that it would not be in the power of a bad angel to will meritoriously, because it is not in his power to have grace nor - by consequence - to use grace, nor even to use his will along with the grace for eliciting his act; but all these negative statements are true because it is not in his power to have the form which he is to use, or to remove impediments.

46. But there is here a doubt, because although what has been said about the active principle is true in comparison with the principal effect (which is to act meritoriously from the grace by which one meritoriously wills), yet it remains doubtful about the dispositive principle - or the principle active for disposition - with respect to the principal agent; namely whether he who has the will as principal active principle can dispose himself for grace.

And if so, then it is in a bad angel’s power to will well, just as this is in the power of a wayfaring sinner; for the bad wayfaring sinner cannot do more than dispose himself, and then grace is given him by God whereby he afterwards acts well.

47. Now whether the wayfarer can have some motion of attrition from his pure natural powers, under the existence of general influence, or whether some special operation is required will be discussed later [Ord. 4 d.14 q.2 n.4]; but on the supposition that he can, someone might deny this dispositive power of a damned angel and assert that it can belong to a wayfaring sinner.

But there is an obstacle to this from the authority of Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.12], which more concedes to a fallen angel the power for returning to good from his pure natural powers than to a fallen man; therefore if a man wayfarer can from his pure natural powers have this dispositive power, much more so can an angel.

48. According to this, then, as to all the members about potency as it is a principle [nn.43-45], it does not seem one should deny of the bad angels that they can will meritoriously, save that they do not have the total principle of meriting, nor the principal partial principle, either with respect to good volition or with respect to the special grace which is required for good volition; and yet neither can a bad angel will well in the same way that a wayfaring sinner can, as will be said later [nn.54-56].

b) On Real Potency which is a Difference of Being

49. If the understanding is about the potency that is a difference of being, namely what is ordered to act - then it can be conceded [sc. that a bad angel can have a meritoriously good will] as to remote potency, namely the potency that follows the idea of passive and active potency (although secondarily and in diminished fashion); but it cannot be conceded as to proximate potency, because it only issues in act when all impediments are removed, such that what has it can at once issue in act; and this sort of potency does not come from the passive potency that a [bad] angel has, nor from the partial cause that the will is; for one of the partial causes needed for acting [sc. grace] is lacking

c) On Logical Potency

50. But if it is understood of logical potency, which states the manner of composition formed by the intellect, then in this way the impossibility can be in the composition either because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms to each other or because of an extrinsic repugnance to what is required for the extremes to be united. An example of the first is ‘man is irrational’. An example of the second is if the eye were in darkness and it were impossible for the opaque obstacle causing the darkness to be removed, then it would be impossible to see; not to be sure because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms (which terms are ‘eye’ and ‘to see’) but from the repugnance to one or other term of something extrinsic, namely the repugnance of the opaque obstacle to the term ‘to see’.

51. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that there is not here [sc. in a bad angel] an impossibility from an intrinsic repugnance of the terms or extremes; on the contrary there is no repugnance to the predicate in the subject. If there is any impossibility, then, it will be from the repugnance of something extrinsic to the union of the extremes; but this extrinsic thing can only be the active cause that is required for the extremes to be united; such a cause, with respect to the union of grace with some subject, is not of a nature to be any other cause than God; therefore, it will only be impossible for the bad angels to will well or to have grace because it is impossible for God to give them grace.

52. Now the impossibility on the part of God is assigned in two ways: on the part of absolute power and on the part of ordained power [Ord. 1 d.44 nn.3-11].

Absolute power is in respect of anything that does not include a contradiction. And it is plain that it is not impossible in this way for God to give grace to that nature; for since that nature is capable of grace (as touched on when discussing passive potency [n.43]), the consequence is that there is no contradiction in the proposition ‘grace actually informs that nature’.

53. The ordained power of God, as was touched on earlier, is that which is conform in its acting to the rules predetermined by divine wisdom (or rather, by divine will [1 d.44 nn.3, 6-7, 1 d.3 n.187]) - and, as to beatifying or punishing the rational creature, the rules are those of ordained justice. These rules are collected from the Scriptures, among which is the authority of Ecclesiastes 11.13, “Wherever the wood falls, there will it be” (that is, in the love of whatever thing the rational creature will have remained, in that it will continue to remain).

54. And Augustine concludes, City of God 21.23, from such rules of Scripture (for example Isaiah 66.24, “their fire will not be extinguished, and their worm will not die,” and Matthew 25.46, “these will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life”), that it is certain God will never give them grace. According to this then it would be impossible for the bad angels to will well, because it is impossible by God’s ordained power to give them grace.

55. But against this it is argued that then there seems to be an impossibility in the same way about the wayfaring sinner who, however, will not in the end repent - for God has pre-ordained not to give him grace; and if the impossibility is only on this side, because of this sort of order, then it does not seem more impossible for a demon to repent than for such a sinner to repent.

I reply that the ordained power of God does not regard particular divine acts (about which there are not universal laws), but regards the universal laws or rules of doable things; of such sort is the law about the damned - and there is no such law about the bad while they are on the way, even if they remain finally bad. An example of this: if someone had laid down that every murderer should be killed, it would not be possible by ordained power - according to the order already in place - to save this particular murderer; if however he could kill a murderer but not because of some such universal law, he could also save him (or not kill him) even by ordained power. Thus a wayfarer who will not be saved can be saved, because there is no universal law laid down already against this as there is against the salvation of the damned.

56. If it be objected against this that ‘as law is about the universal so is judgment according to law about the universal, and the judgment follows from the law (    therefore the reason there can be no going against the law is equally a reason there can be no going against judgment following the law); but this wayfarer, if he will be damned, will be so according to a judgment consonant to the law; therefore etc     .’ - I reply that the law is about him who is bad in the term, and therefore when the law is applied to some particular individual (that is, to this or that already judged individual, because he is in the term), the judgment is no more revoked than is the law; but about this bad individual still present on the way there is no judgment by any law, just as the general law itself does not extend itself to the wayfarer.

57. There is another doubt: is this obstinacy of a bad will from God or from the bad will itself? For if it is from the will, it seems that the will could spring back itself from the obstinacy, just as it could of itself have willed the bad; for the power by which it moves itself to something is the same as that by which it rests in it, and it can withdraw itself from it and move to something else that more inclines it, of which sort is the object of it. But if the obstinacy is in place from God, then the malice will be from God, and thus God is cause of sin, which seems unacceptable.

58. On this point.

Although Augustine [Fulgentius] may seem to say, On the Faith to Peter ch.34 that God has ordained the turning away of the will to evil to abide perpetually, and obstinacy is sign of a bad will - yet because the act, while it exists, has as it were a cause continually (because its being is as it were in a state of continually being caused), then just as God cannot be the cause of bad ‘qua bad’ in the first act of eliciting it so neither is he in its continued being, which is its ‘being continually elicited’; therefore the will alone will be the cause, but from God is the punishment of fire, which is what punishes evil. Also, this obstinacy, as it states the malice of sin in the will, can be said to be from God, not indeed as positively willing it, but as abandoning and refusing to give grace; for just as God graces him whom he disposes to give grace to, so he does not grace him whom he forsakes (that is, with respect to the gracing that he has a refusing of).

59. When, therefore, it is argued that if the obstinacy is from the will alone then the will alone can spring back to the opposite (namely back from the object toward which it inordinately inclined itself) - I reply and say that for springing back meritoriously there is required a principle other than the will, namely grace, which a bad angel cannot have of himself - and God, according to his desertion of him, has disposed not to give him grace. But if you argue that a bad angel can at least have a ‘circumstanced willing’ as to what he inordinately willed, although that willing would not be meritorious for him -then this belongs to the following point, namely about moral goodness [nn.75, 28, 30, 39].

60. From what has been said, then, it seems there is no denial of power, that is, of power as active principle, unless ‘active principle’ is taken to be the total or principal principle [n.44]. Nor is there denial of the power which is order to act, save of proximate power [n.49]. Nor denial of logical power save extrinsically [n.51], on which side there is no impossibility of uniting the extreme terms when speaking of God’s absolute power [n.52], but there is when speaking of his ordained power, as collected from Scripture (as was said before from Augustine [n.54]), because God has not disposed to unite those extreme terms, and because there is no other cause of the permanence of the bad in bad than divine abandonment [n.58] - or the fact God has disposed not to give them grace, since they are in the term [n.59], and that he has not made this disposition about bad wayfarers [nn.55-56].

61. It seems too that this is proved by the authorities of the saints - first from Damascene ch.18, “What the fall is for the angels, this death is for men;” second from Augustine City of God 21.11, 23, “There is nothing more certain in Scripture than the judgment [sc. about the saved and the damned] of Scripture.”

3. On Goodness of Virtue or of Circumstances

62. . It remains now to see about moral goodness and the malice opposed to it [nn.30, 34, 37, 40].

63. Here it is said that the bad angels cannot have a morally good volition, because they deform every volition by some disordered circumstance, referring it inordinately to love of self.

64. Likewise habit in them is perfectly bad, being in the term, and so most perfectly inclines them.

65. Therefore they never will well, because of the first point [n.63] - but they always will badly because of the second point [n.64], namely because of the vehemence of their inclination to evil.

66. For the first of these Augustine is adduced On the Psalms 118.11 n.5, “Lead me, Lord, in the way of your commandments.”“But because one is little able to keep the precepts of love by one’s own strength unless one is helped by him who commands that one do what he commands, ‘lead me,’ the psalmist says, ‘in the way of your commandments, because I have wanted it;’ my will is too little for me, Lord, save in that I have willed that you yourself lead me.” ¹⁰

67. Against the first point [n.63].

They have their natural powers complete (according to Damascene [n.4]), therefore there is in them a natural inclination to good; therefore they can, in accord with that inclination, will something in conformity to it, because their power - considered merely as to its nature - can elicit some act consonant to the natural inclination; therefore they can have an act that is not bad, because not contrary to their nature.

68. Further, they have ‘their worm’ [n.54], which is remorse for their sins; but that remorse is a certain displeasure, which displeasure is not a morally bad act because, although it can be deformed by a disordered circumstance, yet - focusing on the fact it is ‘a willing not to have sinned’ - it does not seem to be formally moral malice.

69. Further, if they do not will punishment to the extent it is an injury to nature, focusing on this alone (without any circumstance), it does not seem to be a morally bad act - because just as it is possible to love one’s own nature in a way that is not morally bad, so is it possible to hate what is contrary to it [n.41].

70. Against the second [n.64] I argue in three ways [nn.70-72].

First because it seems that the will could, of its own liberty, not will or not have any act. The proof is that according to Augustine Retractions 1.22 n.4, “nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself” - and this is not understood of the will as to its first being (because, as to its first being, non-will is more in its power than will), but it is understood as to operation. Therefore the will is more in a bad angel’s power as to operation than any inferior power; but the will can suspend any inferior power from every act - therefore it can also suspend itself; therefore a bad angel does not necessarily will bad.

71. Further, second: what is adduced about habit [n.64] is disproved in two ways.

First, because every habit inclines to some act in the same species; therefore this habit, which is posited as the cause of sinning, inclines either to an act of pride only or to an act of hate only. But to whichever act it is posited as inclining, it seems probable that he [a bad angel] could at some time not have that act, because he can have another act distinctly and with his whole effort, and he cannot have two perfect acts at the same time; therefore there is no single act that is necessarily perpetual from the vehemence of the inclination to it, and consequently there is not in general a bad act present necessarily from the habit.

72. Further, second: a habit is not in the power an idea of acting in a way opposite to the proper way of the power itself - which is proved as was proved before against the two opinions, in the reasoning about the priority of the cause as it is a cause, when the second cause does not determine the mode of acting for the first cause but conversely [n.17]. Therefore if a non-habituated will could non-necessarily will this thing (which belongs to the liberty in it), an habituated will may non-necessarily will it. - And then what the Philosopher says Ethics 7.8.1150a21-22, that ‘the bad man does not repent’, has to be expounded, that it is about ‘repents with difficulty’, because no act can be so intensely in the will that it altogether takes away power for the opposite.

73. As to this article [n.62], then, it seems one can say that the bad angels do not necessarily have some bad act, whether speaking of some determinate act or of some vague or indeterminate one.

74. And as to determinate act the point seems sufficiently plain, because if a bad angel has only a determinate habit, that habit inclines to a definite act, one in species -and it is plain [sc. from n.71] that he can have some act other in species than that one and, for that time, not have another act, and by parity of reasoning not have any other act at all to which such habit does not incline. He may also have several habits inclining to acts diverse in species, but some habit does not incline very strongly; and he is able not to have an act of that ‘non-maximally inclining’ habit; therefore he is able not to have an act of any other habit.

75. As to vague and indeterminate act the same thing is proved; either if he can suspend himself from every volition, as one of the reasons [n.70] proceeded (which, however, assumes a doubt, because it does not seem a bad angel could suspend himself from every act or volition). Or because sometimes he can have a volition that is not bad with the malice contrary to moral goodness, though he not have an act good with complete moral goodness [nn.68, 37] (which good act is based on all the circumstances [n.30]). Although there does not appear in this any impossibility to prevent him having an act completely good morally [n.67]; at any rate this seems probable, that he can have his act to be ‘good in genus’, that is, by focusing on this and not deforming it with circumstances contrary to the circumstances of good volition [n.169]. Or if he has the act circumstanced with certain good circumstances and disordered with certain bad ones, but it is not necessary that he be always bad; for it seems strange to deny natural power in that excellent nature where no reason appears that it should be denied. Yet it is probable that the bad angels do not proceed to act in accord with this power, because of the vehemence of their malice, and it is more probable that they act by this malice than that they act by the natural power by which they have ability for acts that are in some way opposite.

III. To the Principal Arguments

76. To the first principal argument [n.2] the statement is made that, although the bad angels believe, yet the act in them of believing is bad because they hate what they believe. - But against this: an act of intellect, as it precedes an act of will, does not get deformity from a following act of will, but the bad angels can, in that prior act, conceive something true, and this a truth both of speculation (as that ‘God is three’) and of practice (as that ‘God is to be loved’).

77. One can say therefore to this argument that it proves a truth, namely that the bad angels have some act with diminished moral goodness, namely because the act is not bad with the contrary malice, that is, does not have any circumstance contrary to a due circumstance, although it does lack a circumstance that is due; for the bad angels do not believe because of the end that they should believe, and the circumstance of the end is necessary for moral goodness.

78. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘capacity’ and being ‘a sharer’ point to a remote potency when speaking of potency to act [n.49] - or, when speaking of potency which is a principle, they point to a partial, diminished active or passive principle.

79. To the third [n.4] I concede that there is free choice in them.

80. And when you argue that ‘the possibility for sin is not part of free choice’ (according to Anselm [n.4]) - I say that it is one thing to speak of the possibility for sin and another of the power for sin; for the first states order to a deformed act, while the second states the idea of a principle whereby a deformed act can be elicited.

81. Now the first order is not free choice absolutely, nor anything of it, nor is any ‘order to act’ some active principle or part of it.

82. In a second way I say that that by which there is a ‘possibility for sin’ includes two things, one of which is ‘possibility’ and the other is ‘being defective’. And that by which this thing is possible is its ‘possibility’, which ‘possibility’ is per se liberty and power of choice - but the second part does not belong to free choice as it is free choice, but as it is this sort of free choice, namely a defective one; such that, just as free choice in general is that whereby someone can will (and this taking the ‘in general’ as Anselm takes it, as it belongs to God and the blessed), so ‘this’ free choice - a free choice that can sin, namely a created one (that is, belonging to a wayfarer) - is that by which one can will defectively. However a dissimilarity can, up to a point, be posited, that for ‘absolute willing’ the whole positive entity of free will (and it alone) is the principle - but for the deformity in the act nothing positive in free choice is principle first.

83. And then to the form of the argument [n.4] I say that, given there is freedom of choice there, all that follows is that it is the power by which a positive act can be performed, which act is from the power qua power - and consequently that, insofar as there is free choice for it, it is not a sin; but it can be a sin from the defect accompanying the act.

84. However, one can concede the whole argument [n.4], namely that the bad angels have power for not sinning, because they have a power that is not formally sin -although they do not have a power of not sinning, that is, of not being in sin. Just as a sinner is said to be in sin after the sin he has committed has passed, and just as, being deprived of grace, he remains guilty (namely until he does penance for the sin committed), so the bad angels cannot of themselves not sin, that is, not be in sin; nor does their free choice need to be a power for not sinning, that, is for not being in sin.

85. And if you argue according to Anselm that ‘free choice is a power of keeping rightness for its own sake’, and that therefore he who has it can keep rightness by it and so not be in sin - I reply that someone can by free choice keep rightness when it is present (but not otherwise), and this is how Anselm expounds the matter.

86. To the other argument [the sixth, n.7] I say that in the case of merely natural agents there is a return, when all impediments cease, to the natural disposition, provided no violent action prevents it; and the reason is that the intrinsic principle (as far as concerns itself) is necessary in respect of natural goodness, and so always causes this natural goodness unless it is overcome by something that dominates it. But the will is not in this way a cause with respect to goodness in its act, but it has only a certain as it were passive natural inclination to goodness in act, which goodness, although it can give it to the act, yet it is not inclined to the giving of it by natural necessity the way a heavy object is to going downwards.

87. One can say in another way that sin is against nature, that is, against the act that is of a nature to be elicited in concord with and in conformity to the natural inclination; but there is no need, from this, that it be contrary to the will in itself, just as it is not necessary that what is contrary to an effect or an accident be contrary to the cause or the subject, especially when this sort of cause is not a natural cause of its effect but a free one.

88. To the other argument [the fourth, n.5] - about the likeness [between intellect and will] - I say that although it concludes against those who say the intellect is a sufficient mover of the will [nn.9, 19], because they would have to say that the intellect of the first angel [sc. Lucifer] does not rightly conceive any practical principle (because if it did rightly conceive, it would move the will in conformity with itself and so rightly), yet I believe this to be false, because just as the first principles of speculation are true from the terms, so also the first principles of action - and consequently an intellect that can conceive the quiddity of the terms of the first practical principle, and combine them, has a sufficient mover, and a mover ‘by way of nature’, for assenting to that principle; therefore the will, whose act is posterior, cannot impede the intellect in this - or at any rate cannot drive it to assent to the opposite.

89. As to how what is said in the Ethics is true, “everyone bad is ignorant” [n.5, Ethics 3.2.1110b28-30], this has to be dealt with elsewhere [Ord. 3 d.36 nn.11-14].

90. One can however say to the argument that the likeness [between intellect and will] is not valid, because the intellect can be compelled to assent such that it cannot be so blind that - when it apprehends the terms from the evidence of the terms - it cannot conceive the truth of the proposition composed of them. But the will is not compelled by the goodness of the object; therefore it can be so turned aside that no good, however great, when shown it moves it to love it, or at least to love it in ordered way.

91. To the other argument [the fifth, n.6] I say that when a habit is perfect or at its peak (as far as it can be perfected in such a subject, or according to the limit prefixed for it by divine wisdom), all subsequent acts do nothing to increase it but would only proceed from the habit already generated. Just as the acts of a good angel do not increase the habit of his charity, whether effectively or meritoriously (because he is in the term, either according to the nature of the habit or according to the capacity of the subject, or at any rate according to the term prefixed for him by God), but all those acts proceed from the fullness of the habit thus made perfect - so similarly in the issue at hand, the perfection of the habit [of a bad angel] is in the term according to the rule of divine wisdom, which does not permit the bad angels to increase their malice in intensity, and so the subsequent acts are only disposed as effects of a bad habit and not as agent causes of it.

92. The same response works for the point about punishment [n.6], that just as the substantial reward is determinate in the first instant in which an angel is blessed (nor does it then increase, because the good acts that follow are not meritorious, though they are good), so too in the case of a damned angel, he is, in the first instant of his damnation, determined to a definite punishment, which does not increase in intensity. And yet neither will his bad acts which he elicits be unpunished, just as neither will the good acts of a good angel be unrewarded; those good acts, indeed, of a good angel are included in the first act, because they proceed from the perfection of the beatific act - but as to the accidental reward that they can have, any act is its own reward; so too the bad acts which a damned angel elicits, are included in the first punishment determined with certainty for him - and any act, in the way it can have an accidental and a proper punishment, has itself for punishment (“you have commanded, Lord,” says Augustine Confessions 1.12 n.19, “and it is so, that every sinner is a punishment to himself”). For the most powerful and greatest punishment is the privation of the greatest good, and of this sort formally is the malice of guild in an evil act turning away from God. Therefore the punishment of the bad angels increases infinitely in extension, just as does also their malice - but neither increases in intensity.

93. And if you object that a second bad act is demeritorious, therefore a proper punishment corresponds to it - I reply that, although one can concede that a second bad act is guilt, yet it is not properly demeritorious (because it is not elicited by a wayfarer, to whom alone belongs meriting and demeriting), but can more properly be called a damnatory act or an act of someone damned; just as, on the other side, the act of someone blessed, although it is acceptable to God, is yet not properly meritorious but rather beatific or the act of someone blessed, or an act proceeding from blessedness.